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Few court cases in the history of European integration have been more controversial than the 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU and the German Federal Constitutional Court on the 
European Central Bank’s public sector asset purchase programmes. This article regards 
consistency and coherence in the case law as uncontroversial minimum conditions that have to 
be satisfied for the decisions to gain legitimacy. It assesses the case law against this benchmark 
and determines the limits of asset purchase programmes under a consistent and coherent 
application of the legal tests developed by the courts. 
 
 







At the heart of the EU’s response to the unprecedented challenges that European monetary 
union has faced since the sovereign debt crisis are several unconventional monetary policy 
measures of the European Central Bank (ECB) that involve the large-scale purchase of 
government bonds of Eurozone Member States. At the height of the sovereign debt crisis in 
2012, the ECB adopted a decision on so-called outright monetary transactions (OMT). The 
OMT decision consisted in an announcement that the Eurosystem (the ECB and the euro area 
national central banks) stood ready to buy potentially unlimited amounts of government bonds 
of Member States that were in receipt of financial assistance from the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) or its successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in the 
secondary markets.1 Under a second programme, the public sector asset purchase programme 
(PSPP), also known as ‘quantitative easing’, the Eurosystem purchases government bonds of 
all Member States in order to enhance the transmission of monetary policy and contribute to a 
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return of inflation rates to the ECB’s target of close to 2%.2 Most recently, in 2020, the ECB 
adopted a pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) in response to the risks to price 
stability posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.3  
Opinions about the ECB’s asset purchase programmes differ sharply. Central bank asset 
purchases have unequal effects on income and wealth distribution depending on prevailing 
economic conditions in the countries or regions where they take place. The purchase of 
government bonds from financial institutions improves the institutions’ liquidity and 
encourages lending, thus resulting in a downward pressure on interest rates.4 This favours 
borrowers and disadvantages savers, to give one example that has featured prominently in the 
public debate. Given that the savings rate differs substantially across countries in the 
Eurozone,5 it is unsurprising that OMT and the PSPP have been heavily criticised in some 
countries, while they have been welcomed in others.6 
The legal assessment of public sector asset purchases, likewise, is highly contentious. 
Both OMT and the PSPP were challenged before the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC). The FCC referred both cases to the Court of Justice in its first two, and so far, only, 
preliminary references under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).7 
The Court of Justice confirmed the legality of OMT in Gauweiler8 and of the PSPP in Weiss.9 
When the cases returned to the FCC, the Constitutional Court expressed deep reservations. It 
ultimately accepted the decision in Gauweiler, but not without emphasising that it met ‘with 
serious objections’.10 In Weiss, the FCC went a step further and denied the decision of the Court 
of Justice binding force in Germany,11 arguing that the Court’s reasoning was ‘simply not 
comprehensible’,12 ‘objectively arbitrary’13 and ‘no longer tenable from a methodological 
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principles that were applied in Gauweiler and Weiss, and we will refer to the decision where necessary. 
10 BVerfGE 142, 123, 2 BvR 2728/13 (FCC judgment on OMT), para 181. 
11 Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 859/15 (FCC judgment on PSPP), 
para 163. 
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13 ibid. 
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perspective’.14 The literature is more sympathetic, but there is no common view on either the 
merits of the arguments advanced by the two courts, or on the conditions under which asset 
purchases are in compliance with the monetary policy mandate of the ECB and the prohibition 
of monetary financing enshrined in the Treaty.15 
The disagreements have various repercussions. In the short run, they cast doubt on the 
permissibility of the PEPP, which has been challenged as unconstitutional in the FCC.16 In the 
long run, the FCC’s response to Gauweiler and Weiss undermines the supremacy of the EU 
legal order and the authority of the Court of Justice. The FCC’s reasoning and its conclusion 
in Weiss that the Court of Justice acted ultra vires can be criticised on a variety of grounds.17 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice will only be able to (re-)assert its authority as final arbiter of 
the legality of monetary policy decisions if the legal tests that it has developed withstand 
scrutiny. This is the topic of the present article. We assess the Court’s case law against the 
benchmarks of consistency and coherence as preconditions for its ability to adjudicate with 
authority and legitimacy. Likewise, a consistent and coherent application of the legal principles 
underlying public sector asset purchases is indispensable for the ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policy measures to gain acceptance across the Eurozone, including in those regions 
where they are perceived as having negative consequences for particular constituencies. 
The article makes three contributions. First, it directs attention to criteria used by the 
Court of Justice to determine whether a measure falls within the scope of the ECB’s monetary 
policy mandate that have only been discussed in passing in the literature, if at all: the direct 
and indirect effects of a monetary policy measure. It shows that on an interpretation based on 
the ordinary meaning of these criteria the FCC’s criticism that the ECB is able to define the 
scope of its mandate autonomously is misplaced,18 but also that Gauweiler and Weiss have 
been decided inconsistently by the Court of Justice. 
Second, the article offers an analysis of the legality of the PEPP, and more generally of 
public sector asset purchase programmes, under a consistent and coherent application of the 
legal tests of the Court of Justice. It also shows that some of the criteria that are held out by the 
FCC as indispensable for public sector asset purchases to comply with the prohibition of 
monetary financing are incoherent. The article makes suggestions for how to align the tests of 
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15 TFEU, Arts 119, 123(1), 127. For critical voices from the literature, see Mark Dawson and Ana Bobić, 
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56 CML Rev. 1005, 1040; Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme: The 
Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and Monetary Union’ (2015) 11 
EuConst 563, 575; Nicole Scicluna, ‘Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB and EU 
constitutionalism in the crisis’ (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy 1874, 1881-1883. An in-depth 
treatment of all stages of the development of the case law on monetary union can be found in several special issues 
of the German Law Journal: Pringle in vol. 14(1) (2013); the preliminary reference of the FCC in Gauweiler in 
vol. 15(2) (2014); the Gauweiler judgment of the Court of Justice in vol. 16(4) (2015); and most recently the 
FCC’s judgment in Weiss in vol. 21(5) (2020). 
16 AfD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, Boehringer: AfD-Fraktion hat Organklage gegen das EZB-
Anleihekaufprogramm PEPP eingereicht [AfD group in the German Federal Parliament files a complaint 
challenging the ECB bond purchase programme PEPP], press release of 28 August 2020. 
17 See section III.B. 
18 It has been argued that democratic accountability of the ECB requires that the ECB cannot define its mandate 
autonomously, Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, ‘The Democratic Accountability of the European 
Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales’ (2000) 38 J. Common Mark. Stud. 394, 397-398. 
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the two courts in order to alleviate the risk of further open judicial conflict when the 
proceedings over the legality of the PEPP reach the Court of Justice. 
Finally, Gauweiler and Weiss are, arguably, ‘hard cases’, not only because of their 
political dimension, but also because the relevant Treaty provisions use terms that are neither 
defined in the Treaty, nor associated with a clearly delineated meaning, such as ‘monetary 
policy’.19 In such cases, courts often appeal to legal principles of a higher order to resolve an 
interpretive conflict.20 However, higher-order principles, owing to their generality, will also 
often be open to different interpretations or, where two or more higher-order principles can be 
invoked, it may be difficult to reconcile these principles.21 For example, in the present context, 
there is a tension between the preservation of financial stability in the Eurozone, which may 
require fiscal transfers to address the asymmetric impacts of economic shocks on Member State 
finances, and budgetary autonomy of the Member States, which militates against transfer 
payments.22 While it is possible rationally to disagree about the most appropriate resolution of 
a conflict over the interpretation of a principle, or between two principles, it can be assumed 
that there is broad agreement that any solution must be consistent and coherent. Our approach 
can thus hope to establish common ground, on which further discussions can build. 
The analysis that follows will be premised on the courts’ understanding of the 
objectives of the relevant Treaty provisions and the legal tests developed by the courts. On that 
basis, the article will examine whether Gauweiler and Weiss have been decided consistently 
and coherently. Consistency, as the term is used here, refers to the non-contradictory 
formulation and application of legal rules and principles. A norm should be given the same 
meaning across and within cases, with the consequence that cases that differ factually along a 
relevant dimension should be treated differently, and cases that do not differ along that 
dimension should be treated alike, all else being equal.23 A legal solution to a particular social 
conflict is coherent if the rules that apply to the conflict contribute to the attainment of the 
higher-order principle that guides a regulation of the relevant issues.24 For example, if the 
preservation of sound public finances is seen as the main objective of the prohibition of 
monetary financing (as it is in the opinion of the Court of Justice), an interpretation that requires 
 
19 TFEU, Art 119(2). 
20 The account of first and second-order conflicts in this paragraph draws on Neil MacCormick, ‘The Limits of 
Rationality in Legal Reasoning’ in Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Reidel 
1986), 189, 203-205. MacCormick’s conceptual framework has been applied to the legal reasoning of the Court 
of Justice by Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 
1993), 168-172, 224-225. 
21 MacCormick (n 20) 203. 
22 The Court of Justice, in Pringle (n 9) para 135, ascribed ‘a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial 
stability of the monetary union’ to Art 125 TFEU. It accordingly held that ‘the activation of financial assistance 
by means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM’ was compatible with Art 125 if it was ‘indispensable for the 
safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole’, ibid para 136. On this aspect of Pringle, see 
Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (CUP 2014), 120-136, who speak 
of the ‘two-order telos’ of Art 125. The FCC, on the other hand, in its OMT referral to the Court of Justice (n 7) 
para 102, emphasised the importance of the budgetary autonomy of the German parliament, which would be 
violated if the EU institutions ‘created a mechanism [amounting] to an assumption of liability for decisions of 
third parties which entail[ed] consequences that [were] difficult to calculate’. 
23 Our definition of consistency is based loosely on Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP 
1994) 106. 
24 ibid 106-107, 152-157. 
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unconventional monetary policy measures to exhibit certain technical features is incoherent if 
these features do not in fact contribute to the preservation of sound public finances. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section II gives a brief overview of the questions at 
issue in Gauweiler and Weiss. Sections III and IV form the core of the article. Through the lens 
of consistency and coherence, we first analyse the reasons given by the Court of Justice for 
holding that OMT and the PSPP fall within the monetary policy mandate of the ECB, and the 
reasons given by the FCC why the PSPP (but not OMT) exceeds the ECB’s mandate. We then 
examine whether the view that the two asset purchase programmes do not constitute monetary 
financing (on which both courts agree) is coherent, given the objective of the prohibition of 
monetary financing. Section V determines the limits of public sector asset purchase 
programmes under a consistent and coherent application of the legal tests and analyses the 
legality of the PEPP. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The proceedings in Gauweiler and Weiss revolved around two foundational features of the 
constitutional architecture of European monetary union: the competences of the ECB and the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in the area of monetary policy25 and the prohibition 
of monetary financing.26 The proceedings have been described in detail in the literature, and 
there is no need to reproduce these accounts here.27 Instead, we will focus on the characteristics, 
operation, and economic relevance of the measures challenged in the two cases—the two 
decisions of the ECB announcing outright monetary transactions and public sector asset 
purchases—insofar as this is relevant to our critique of the legal reasoning of the Court of 
Justice and the FCC. 
 Outright monetary transactions involve the purchase of government bonds of 
selected Member States in the secondary market with the aim of ‘safeguarding an appropriate 
monetary policy transmission’.28 The Eurosystem’s intervention is subject to no ex ante 
quantitative limits, but conditional on the participation of the Member States concerned in an 
EFSF or ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme that requires the implementation of 
macroeconomic reforms prepared and supervised by the European Commission in liaison with 
the ECB and IMF.29 Until today, the Eurosystem has carried out no transactions under its OMT 
programme.  
 
25 TFEU, Arts 119 and 127. 
26 TFEU, Art 123(1). 
27 From the voluminous literature, see on Gauweiler, among others: Dariusz Adamski, ‘Economic constitution of 
the euro area after the Gauweiler preliminary ruling’ (2015) 52 CML Rev. 1451; Vestert Borger, ‘Outright 
Monetary Transactions and the Stability Mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler’ (2016) 53 CML Rev. 139; Hinarejos (n 
15); Takis Tridimas and Napoleon Xanthoulis, ‘A Legal Analysis of the Gauweiler Case: Between Monetary 
Policy and Constitutional Conflict’ (2016) 23 MJ 17; and on Weiss, among others: Dawson and Bobić (n 15); 
Annelieke AM Mooij, ‘The Weiss judgment: The Court’s further clarification of the ECB’s legal framework’ 
(2019) 26 MJ 449. 
28 ECB Press Release (n 1). 
29 ibid. 
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 The PSPP was adopted to respond to a ‘materially increased … downside risk to the 
medium-term outlook on price developments,’ which, in the words of the ECB, ‘jeopardis[ed] 
the achievement of the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability.’30 Like OMT, 
the PSPP involves the purchase of government bonds in the secondary market. In contrast to 
OMT, the ECB and the euro area national central banks purchase the bonds of all Eurozone 
Member States largely in proportion to the ECB’s capital key (with the exception of Member 
States whose bonds are not eligible for purchase31) and conditionality does not apply.32 The 
PSPP was initially carried out between March 2015 and December 2018 and restarted in 
November 2019. As of February 2021, cumulative net purchases (purchases minus 
redemptions) under the PSPP amounted to €2.5tn.33 
 It is the stated aim of both OMT and the PSPP to address tensions in financial 
markets that, according to the ECB, were hampering the effective transmission of monetary 
policy and credit provision to the economy.34 Thus, the programmes ostensibly pursue 
monetary policy goals. They are qualified by the ECB as non-standard monetary policy 
measures that are deployed when conventional policy instruments fail to produce their intended 
effects.35 However, there is widespread agreement that the OMT programme contributed 
critically to containing the Eurozone crisis at its height in 2012, when Mario Draghi made his 
famous statement that the ECB would ‘do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’,36 followed 
by a more formal announcement of the OMT programme a few months later.37 The 
announcement as such was sufficient to calm markets and reduce sovereign bond spreads in 
the Eurozone to levels that did not call the ability of individual Member States into question to 
refinance their debt.38 
The legal challenges against OMT and the PSPP were based on similar arguments. The 
applicants in the main proceedings submitted that the bond purchase programmes exceeded the 
powers of the ESCB pursuant to Articles 119(2), 127 TFEU and violated the prohibition of 
monetary financing pursuant to Article 123(1) TFEU.39 They exceeded the powers of the ESCB 
 
30 Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2), recital 3. 
31 Art 3 Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2) sets out eligibility criteria for government bonds that can be purchased 
under the PSPP. In particular, bonds must be of investment grade. 
32 Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2), Art 6. 
33 Data from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. 
34 Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2), recital 2; Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2), recital 2. 
35 Conventional policy instruments are open market operations, standing facilities and reserve requirements for 
credit institutions, Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank, Arts 18, 19. 
36 Mario Draghi, speech at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012. He made similar remarks 
at the press conference where the OMT decision was announced, ECB, Introductory statement to the press 
conference of 6 September 2012, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/html/index.en.html. 
37 ECB Press Release (n 1). For an overview of existing research concerning the EU’s response to the Eurozone 
crisis, see Tal Sadeh, ‘How did the euro area survive the crisis?’ (2019) 42 West European Politics 201 
38 Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Esin Küçük, and Edmund Schuster, ‘Law Meets Economics in the German Federal 
Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial’ (2014) 15 German L.J. 281, 298-301. 
39 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others EU:C:2015:400, paras 94, 206; Opinion 
of AG Wathelet in Case C-493/17 Weiss and Others EU:C:2018:1000, para 25. 
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because they had ‘a direct impact on the financing sources of … Member States’40 and, in the 
case of OMT, their ‘true objective’ was ‘to “save the euro”’.41 These were economic policy 
goals that fell within the exclusive remit of the Member States.42 Furthermore, the applicants 
contended that the programmes circumvented the prohibition laid down in Article 123(1) 
TFEU, because purchases under OMT and the PSPP were, in their economic effects and the 
incentives they created for Member States to adjust their budgetary policies, equivalent to 
direct purchases of government bonds in the primary market.43 The Court of Justice held that 
OMT and the PSPP complied with the Treaty in all respects. The FCC accepted the Court’s 
assessment of OMT, provided asset purchases were subject to strict limits.44 It also concluded 
that the PSPP did not ‘manifestly’ circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing.45 
However, it held that the ECB had exceeded its monetary policy mandate, because it had failed 
to balance the monetary policy objectives pursued with the PSPP against the economic policy 
effects of the programme.46 We will deal with these two points—the ECB’s monetary policy 
mandate and the prohibition of monetary financing—in the next two sections. 
 
III. MONETARY POLICY MANDATE 
The EU has exclusive competence to conduct a single monetary policy for the Member States 
whose currency is the euro, while economic policy falls within the competence of the Member 
States.47 Pursuant to Articles 119(2), 127 TFEU, the primary objective of the EU’s monetary 
policy is the maintenance of price stability. Other than this reference, the Treaty contains no 
description of what monetary policy involves. In both Gauweiler and Weiss, the question 
therefore arose how to delimit the ECB’s mandate and distinguish monetary from economic 
policy. We will discuss first the formula developed by the Court of Justice and then the 




40 Gauweiler, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 39) para 94. Similar concerns were raised in Weiss (n 9) para 16 
(third question referred by the German Federal Constitutional Court). 
41 Gauweiler, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 39) para 95. 
42 TFEU, Art 120. 
43 Gauweiler, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 39) paras 205-208; Weiss, Opinion of AG Wathelet (n 39) para 54. 
44 In its reference in Gauweiler, the FCC held that an asset purchase programme violated the prohibition of 
monetary financing, unless the volume of the programme was limited, interest rate spreads were not neutralised, 
purchases did not interfere more than necessary with the process of price formation, in particular because the 
Eurosystem observed a blackout period before it purchased bonds on the secondary market, bonds were not held 
until maturity, and the ESCB did not participate in a debt cut, OMT referral (n 7) paras 87-94, 100; FCC judgment 
on OMT (n 10) paras 190-196. 
45 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) paras 197-217. 
46 ibid paras 167-177. 
47 Art 3(1)(c) TEU. 
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A. Inconsistency, part 1: The Court’s direct/indirect effects test 
Since Pringle, the Court of Justice has used a two-pronged test to distinguish between monetary 
and economic policy. It asks, first, whether the ECB pursues an objective that belongs to 
monetary or economic policy and, second, whether the instrument used to achieve that 
objective can be qualified as a monetary or an economic policy instrument.48 The second part 
of this test is easy to apply, since the ECB’s monetary policy instruments are enumerated in 
the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB. Open market operations are a widely used type of 
monetary policy instrument. They are carried out, among other means, by buying and selling 
marketable instruments in financial markets.49 Both OMT and the PSPP fall squarely within 
this definition.50 
The first part of the Court’s test is more problematic. The purported goals of both OMT 
and the PSPP are standard monetary policy objectives: repairing the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and safeguarding the singleness of monetary policy.51 A functioning 
monetary policy transmission mechanism is a precondition for benchmark interest rate 
decisions to influence inflation and hence the ECB’s ability to achieve its primary objective of 
maintaining price stability.52 Furthermore, Article 119(2) TFEU provides that the Eurozone 
shall have ‘a single monetary policy’, which is not the case if monetary policy decisions are 
ineffective in some parts of the Eurozone because of a disruption to the transmission 
mechanism. This much was not disputed in Gauweiler and Weiss. In response to the 
submissions of the applicants in the main proceedings, the Court of Justice then added a second 
step to the analysis that went beyond the stated goals of the measures and inquired into their 
effects. This second layer of analysis can be seen as an objective corrective to a test that 
necessarily has to rely on the published rationale behind a measure and, hence, is largely 
subjective.53 The Court held that a measure whose stated aim concerned the promotion of the 
monetary policy objectives of Articles 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU was not equivalent to an 
economic policy measure ‘for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects that can also be 
sought in the context of economic policy’.54 This test relied on Pringle, where the Court had 
stated that a financial assistance mechanism that was designed to safeguard financial stability 
had to be regarded as falling within economic policy and did not become ‘a monetary policy 
measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on [a monetary policy objective 
such as] the stability of the euro’.55 Conversely, in Gauweiler and Weiss, the effect of OMT on 
 
48 Pringle (n 9) para 55; Gauweiler (n 8) para 46; Weiss (n 9) para 53. 
49 Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Art 
18.1. 
50 Gauweiler (n 8) para 54; Weiss (n 9) para 69.  
51 ECB Press Release (n 1); Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2) recitals 2-4; Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2), recitals 2, 
10. See also the text to nn 28, 30, and 34 above. 
52 The monetary policy transmission mechanism will be discussed in more detail presently in the text. 
53 In analysing the objectives of OMT and the PSPP, the Court indeed relied exclusively on the press release and 
the ECB decision setting out the aims of the two programmes, and discussed whether these aims were consistent 
with the objectives of monetary policy as formulated in Arts 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU, Gauweiler (n 8) paras 47-
50; Weiss (n 9) paras 54-57. 
54 Weiss (n 9) para 61. Similar Gauweiler (n 8) para 52. 
55 Pringle (n 9) para 56. 
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financial stability and the impact of the PSPP on refinancing conditions of Eurozone 
governments were, in the opinion of the Court, examples of indirect economic policy effects.56 
From the discussion of indirect effects in Gauweiler and Weiss, it is not easy to 
understand how the Court’s test is intended to operate.57 Some passages especially in Weiss, 
which contains the most detailed examination of indirect effects,58 seem contradictory. For 
example, the Court acknowledged that the PSPP was capable of having an impact on the 
balance sheets of commercial banks that sold government bonds to the Eurosystem and that 
such an effect might also be sought through economic policy measures.59 In the following 
paragraphs, it then dismissed the argument that this effect called the monetary policy nature of 
the PSPP into question, because indirect effects had ‘no consequences for the purposes of 
classification of the measures at issue’.60 Taken literally, the Court’s example is perplexing. 
Asset purchases by the Eurosystem have, by definition, a direct impact on the balance sheets 
of the sellers (and their refinancing conditions) by replacing one asset (government bonds) with 
another (cash). On the other hand, the one effect that falls undoubtedly within the area of 
monetary policy—the impact of asset purchases on price stability—is clearly an indirect effect. 
The ECB has no direct influence over inflation and instead affects price levels through various 
economic channels. As the Court of Justice emphasised in both Gauweiler and Weiss, such 
economic effects are a precondition for the ECB’s policy decisions to achieve their ultimate 
objective.61  
One possible interpretation of the Court’s comments on indirect effects is this: All 
effects other than those that have an impact on the singleness of European monetary policy and 
price stability (the monetary policy objectives laid down in Articles 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU) 
are by definition indirect effects. However, this interpretation would distort the ordinary 
meaning of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. If this is what the Court had meant, it would have been more 
natural to speak simply of ‘effects’. It would also render the effects-based considerations in 
Gauweiler and Weiss largely redundant. Provided a measure’s purported goal belonged to 
monetary policy and it had some (direct or indirect) effects on monetary policy objectives, it 
would qualify as a monetary policy measure. Indirect effects on price stability are, however, 
widespread when economic policy decisions are taken.62 A test that did not assess the direct 
 
56 Gauweiler (n 8) paras 51-52; Weiss (n 9) paras 63-64.  
57 In spite of their importance for a distinction between economic and monetary policy, the Court’s considerations 
of the effects of asset purchases in Gauweiler and Weiss have not received much attention in the literature. An 
exception is Armin Steinbach, ‘Effect-based analysis in the court’s jurisprudence on the euro crisis’ (2017) 42 
E.L. Rev. 254. 
58 Weiss (n 9) paras 58-67. 
59 ibid para 59. 
60 ibid para 63. 
61 Gauweiler (n 8) para 108; Weiss (n 9) paras 64-67. 
62 See, e.g., Klaus Weyerstrass, Johannes Jaenicke, Reinhard Neck, Gottfried Haber, Bas van Aarle, Koen Schoors, 
Niko Gobbin and Peter Claeys, ‘Economic Spillover and Policy Coordination in the Euro Area’ (2006) European 
Economy Economic Paper No 246 (showing that, for example, measures contributing to fiscal consolidation and 
structural reform—both clearly outside of the mandate of the ECB—have effects on interest rates and, through 
them, price levels). 
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(or alternatively the predominant63) effects of a measure would make any objective 
differentiation between monetary and economic policy therefore largely impossible. 
More convincing is an alternative interpretation that is based on the ordinary meaning 
of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ and distinguishes between monetary and economic policy effects by 
asking whether an effect is a necessary part of the transmission of a monetary policy decision. 
This interpretation would lead to a clear demarcation of monetary policy and allow us to make 
sense of the Court’s examples in Weiss. Secondary market asset purchases have an impact on 
a bank’s balance sheet and refinancing conditions. Even though these effects are economic in 
nature, they do not result in a qualification of asset purchase programmes as economic policy 
instruments, because they contribute directly to the transmission of monetary policy decisions. 
Or, to put it differently: the direct effects of such a measure belong to monetary policy because 
they are part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The impact that secondary 
market asset purchases have on the refinancing conditions of Eurozone governments also do 
not render the measure an economic policy measure, because these are indirect economic 
effects. 
However, it is questionable whether the direct/indirect effects test, thus understood, can 
justify the conclusion that both OMT and the PSPP are monetary policy measures. Both 
purchase programmes were intended to, and did, address disruptions to the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, and both had some effects on goals belonging to economic policy. 
However, the similarities end there. In order to investigate the precise effects of the two 
programmes and their differences, a brief description of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism may be useful. Monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the economy in several 
steps. Simplifying considerably, a central bank sets the interest rates under its control, in the 
Eurozone in particular the rates on the main refinancing operations (the rate at which the central 
bank provides short-term liquidity to financial institutions), the deposit facility (the rate at 
which banks can make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem), and the marginal lending 
facility (the rate at which banks can borrow money overnight from the Eurosystem). These 
rates affect the refinancing costs of financial institutions in the money market and, through 
these, the rates at which banks lend to, and accept deposits from, their customers. The latter 
rates, in turn, influence asset prices and saving, consumption, and investment decisions of 
households and firms. Finally, the behaviour of households and firms affects supply and 
demand in the markets for goods and services and shifts prices in these markets accordingly. 
At the time of the OMT decision, the Governing Council of the ECB considered the 
Eurozone to be in a ‘bad equilibrium’ where concerns about the solvency of some Member 
States and the continued viability of monetary union had driven interest rates on government 
bonds up. This made it more costly for Member States to refinance their debts, thus creating 
the risk that a liquidity crisis would degenerate into a solvency crisis, irrespective of the 
question whether the initial concerns (fully) justified the spike in interest rates.64 The monetary 
policy transmission mechanism was disrupted because financial institutions in the affected 
 
63 An assessment of the predominant effects of a policy measure is effectively what the FCC suggests through its 
lens of proportionality, see the discussion in Section III.B. 
64 Mario Draghi, press conference of 6 September 2012 (n 36). For a formal model, see Paul De Grauwe and 
Yuemei Ji, ‘Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test’ (2013) 34 Journal of International Money 
and Finance 15, 33-35. 
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Member States were effectively excluded from international capital and money markets as the 
macroeconomic environment deteriorated.65 The ECB’s intervention was intended to eliminate 
the risk premia that reflected the threat that a liquidity crisis might develop into a self-fulfilling 
solvency crisis.66 The bank did so by offering to buy potentially unlimited amounts of 
government bonds from solvent issuers,67 thus performing a de facto role of lender of last resort 
for national governments to resolve liquidity (but not solvency) crises.68 
In contrast, the PSPP was adopted because the ECB’s standard monetary policy tools 
had been exhausted. At the time of the initial commencement of the purchase programme in 
March 2015 and when it was restarted in November 2019, the rates on the main refinancing 
operations and the marginal lending facility were close to or at their zero bound, and the deposit 
facility rate was negative.69 Nevertheless, inflation remained significantly below the central 
bank’s target of close to 2%.70 The bond purchase programme was initiated because, among 
other reasons, the ECB was of the view that the adopted monetary policy measures had resulted 
in a ‘lower than expected monetary stimulus’ and there was no room to loosen monetary policy 
further by using traditional tools.71 By purchasing government bonds from private institutions 
in the secondary market, the programme was intended to ‘induc[e] financial intermediaries to 
increase their provision of liquidity to the interbank market and credit to the euro area 
economy’.72 
It is clear from this description that OMT and the PSPP are qualitatively very different 
measures that have different direct and indirect effects. The (intended and actual) direct effect 
of OMT was the resolution of a liquidity crisis that imperilled the solvency of financial 
institutions, governments, and more generally financial stability.73 It thus had effects 
 
65 See, for example, Yannis Stournaras, ‘The impact of the Greek sovereign crisis on the banking sector – 
challenges to financial stability and policy responses by the Bank of Greece’, 8 June 2016, p 2, available at 
www.bis.org/review/r160628a.htm.  
66 In the words of Mario Draghi at the press conference of 6 September 2012 (n 36), the ECB sought to ‘break’ 
the self-fulfilling expectations of the impending insolvency of Eurozone states and a disintegration of the 
Eurozone. 
67 OMT is conditional on the relevant Member State receiving EFSF/ESM assistance (ECB Press Release (n 1)), 
and such assistance is only granted when the public debt of the recipient state is sustainable. Pursuant to the ESM 
Treaty, Art 13(1)(b), the Commission conducts a debt sustainability analysis together with the IMF before 
financial assistance is granted. If the debt sustainability analysis reveals that a country could be insolvent, the 
recipient state is required to negotiate a comprehensive plan with its private creditors to restore debt sustainability, 
European Commission, European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – Q&A, MEMO/10/636. 
68 Paul De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (13th ed., OUP 2020), 133-135; Kun Hu, ‘The Institutional 
Innovation of the Lender of Last Resort Facility in the Eurozone’ (2014) 36 Journal of European Integration 627. 
While OMT effectively enables the ECB to perform lender-of-last-resort functions for the member states of the 
Eurozone, the Maastricht Treaty that established monetary union did not provide for a lender of last resort, and 
the provisions on monetary union discussed here call into question whether lender-of-last-resort activities of the 
ECB are covered by the Treaty. See Borger (n 27) 148-152 and 184-185 for an overview of the legal issues. 
69 The key interest rates are published on the website of the ECB, www.ecb.europa.eu/stats (follow hyperlinks 
‘ECB/Eurosystem policy and exchange rates’ and ‘Official interest rates’). 
70 When the programme was initially announced and when it was restarted, in January 2015 and September 2019, 
inflation was -0.6% and 0.8%, respectively. Data are from https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu. 
71 Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2) recital 3; Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2), recital 6. 
72 Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2) recital 4. 
73 Members of the Executive Board of the ECB acknowledged that the ECB saw the OMT decision as a tool to 
prevent a breakup of the Eurozone and contribute to a resolution of the sovereign debt crisis, Peter Praet, The 
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comparable to financial assistance granted by the ESM, which the Court held to be a matter of 
economic policy in Pringle. As a consequence of the resolution of the liquidity crisis and the 
restoration of an equilibrium in the money market that was not distorted by self-fulfilling 
expectations (and hence as an indirect effect of OMT), the ECB’s intervention ensured that 
benchmark interest rate decisions would influence the money market and would be transmitted 
further to the real economy.74 The PSPP, on the other hand, operates directly at the second 
stage of the transmission mechanism by increasing demand for government bonds and hence 
lowering refinancing costs for financial institutions, which can then be passed on to the 
institutions’ customers. The Court’s direct/indirect-effects distinction, therefore, if it is 
understood as we suggest here, provides a satisfactory explanation for the classification of the 
PSPP, but not OMT, as a monetary policy measure.75 
 
B. Incoherence, part 1, and inconsistency, part 2: The FCC’s proportionality test 
The German Federal Constitutional Court suggested an alternative type of effects-based test to 
delimit monetary policy on objective grounds. It held in its judgment in Weiss that a measure 
that was ostensibly adopted to pursue a monetary policy objective exceeded the ECB’s mandate 
if the economic and social policy effects resulting from the measure, for example its effects on 
‘public debt, personal savings, pension and retirement schemes, real estate prices and the 
[preservation] of economically unviable companies’, were disproportionate to its monetary 
policy goals.76 Since Gauweiler, the Court of Justice has also held that a bond-buying 
programme can only be adopted and implemented if it is proportionate.77 However, the FCC’s 
proposed proportionality test deviates from that of the Court of Justice in two important 
respects. First, in Gauweiler and Weiss, the proportionality principle was used to constrain the 
exercise of an existing power,78 whereas it served to distinguish between monetary and 
economic policy in the FCC’s judgment.79 A measure that has disproportionate effects on 
 
ECB and its role as lender of last resort during the crisis, speech at the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 
conference, ‘The Lender of Last Resort – an international perspective’, 10 February 2016, available at available 
at www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016. See in particular fn. 2 of the transcript of the speech. For evidence 
associating the announcement of OMT with a substantial decrease in sovereign bond yields in the Eurozone, see 
Carlo Altavilla, Domenico Giannone and Michele Lenza, ‘The Financial and Macroeconomic Effects of the OMT 
Announcements’ (2016) 12 International Journal of Central Banking 29; Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji, 
‘Correcting for the Eurozone Design Failures: The Role of the ECB’ (2015) 37 Journal of European Integration 
739; Jannik Jäger and Theocharis Grigoriadis, ‘The effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: 
Comparative evidence from crisis and non-crisis Euro-area countries’ (2017) 78 Journal of International Money 
and Finance 21. 
74 Indeed, AG Cruz Villalón said as much in his opinion in Gauweiler. He explained that unblocking the monetary 
policy transmission channels was the ‘indirect aim’ of the OMT programme, and reducing the interest rates 
required of certain Member States to ‘normal levels’ its ‘immediate objective’, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 
39) para 259. 
75 The outcome in the two cases would, of course, be consistent if the first possible interpretation of the 
direct/indirect-effects distinction, described in the text to nn 62-63 above, was adopted. However, as we discuss 
there, this interpretation is unconvincing. 
76 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 139. 
77 Gauweiler (n 8) para 66; Weiss (n 9) para 71. 
78 This is clear from Gauweiler (n 8) para 66 and Weiss (n 9) para 71, stating that ‘a bond-buying programme 
forming part of monetary policy’ must comply with the principle of proportionality (emphasis added). 
79 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) paras 127, 139-143. 
 13 
considerations falling within the area of economic policy becomes an economic policy 
measure, even if it (ostensibly or actually) pursues monetary policy objectives. Second, rather 
than performing a comprehensive balancing of all economic and monetary policy effects of a 
monetary policy measure, the Court of Justice simply assesses whether the measure is suitable 
and necessary to attain its objectives and the risk of losses that asset purchases entail is not 
disproportionate to the interests promoted by the measure.80 
A number of arguments could be made against the FCC’s proportionality test and in 
favour of the direct/indirect effects test of the Court of Justice.81 The FCC relies on 
proportionality to give substance to the principle of conferral. In the opinion of the FCC, the 
principle of conferral would be rendered ‘meaningless’ if the ECB’s adherence to its monetary 
policy mandate could not be reviewed fully in light of the principle of proportionality.82 
However, this approach has the consequence that the scope of the Union’s competence in 
monetary policy matters expands or shrinks depending on the state of the economy and the 
behaviour of economic actors, for example the savings rate and the preference to hold cash or 
invest in equity compared with an investment in debt instruments. Furthermore, any policy 
decision of the ECB, including a decision belonging to its standard monetary policy tools, for 
example the setting of a benchmark interest rate, could be challenged on the ground that certain 
economic effects of the decision had not been considered, or had not been accorded sufficient 
weight, and would have to be qualified as falling within economic policy if its effects on the 
real economy were disproportionate. Even if courts generally appreciate the need to afford the 
ECB discretion, there will be a risk that different perspectives regarding the weighting of the 
interests at stake will make the outcome of litigation more unpredictable. This, in turn, may 
cast doubt on the legality of actions that fall within the core area of the ECB’s mandate and 
undermine the legitimacy of its monetary policy in those parts of the Union where people 
disagree with how the ECB balances conflicting economic interests. 
However, we acknowledge that it is possible rationally to disagree about these points.83 
In particular, it is important to be conscious of the fact that the Court of Justice applies review 
standards of different intensity depending on the context. The clearest difference exists between 
the review of measures of the Union and national measures. In the former case, the Court is 
generally reluctant to intervene, unless the measure is manifestly inappropriate or the result of 
 
80 Gauweiler (n 8) para 66-92; Weiss (n 9) paras 71-100. 
81 The approach of the FCC has met with overwhelming criticism by commentators. For a summary of initial 
reactions, mostly published in blogposts, see Annegret Engel, Julian Nowag and Xavier Groussot, ‘Is This 
Completely M.A.D.? Three Views on the Ruling of the German FCC on 5th May 2020’ (2020) 3 Nordic Journal 
of European Law 128, 134-139. A more in-depth analysis is offered by the contributions to the special issue of 
the German Law Journal in vol. 21(5) (2020): Special Collection on European Constitutional Pluralism and the 
PSPP Judgment, and by Ana Bobić and Mark Dawson, ‘Making sense of the “incomprehensible”: The PSPP 
Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2020) 57 CML Rev. 1953, 1974-1982. 
82 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 123. 
83 For a (qualified) defence of the proportionality test as formulated by the FCC in Weiss, see, for example, 
Matthias Goldmann, ‘The European Economic Constitution after the PSPP Judgment: Towards Integrative 
Liberalism?’ (2020) 21 German L.J. 1058, 1073-1075; Sven Simon and Hannes Rathke, ‘“Simply not 
comprehensible.” Why?’ (2020) 21 German L.J. 950, 951-953. 
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a manifest error or misuse of power.84 In the latter case, the Court is more demanding and 
requires a showing that there is no less restrictive alternative.85 Further differentiations in the 
standard of review are a function of the nature of the right or interest invoked by the applicant, 
the policy area, and the relative expertise of the Court compared with that of the decision-
making body.86 The review standard applied to the ECB is, arguably, at the low-intensity end 
of a spectrum that has been said to range from very deferential to rigorous.87 The FCC’s holding 
in Weiss has to be read primarily as a challenge to these perceived double standards, which, in 
the absence of other effective checks, leave it largely to the ECB to determine its mandate,88 
rather than as an attempt to impose a ‘German understanding of proportionality’89 on the rest 
of the EU.90 
In the spirit of the general line of inquiry pursued in this article, we will therefore only 
probe the FCC’s conclusion that the Court of Justice acted ultra vires from the perspective of 
whether it is rationally defensible. We will approach the FCC’s assertion that the decision in 
Weiss was methodologically untenable from two angles. We will first examine the FCC’s 
response to the test developed by the Court of Justice to distinguish between monetary and 
economic policy, and we will then ask whether the FCC applied its precedent in Gauweiler 
consistently in Weiss. 
The FCC argued that the Court of Justice, in ascertaining whether a measure fell within 
the area of monetary policy: 
 
accepts the proclaimed objectives of the ECB as fact without further scrutiny and 
without regard to foreseeable and/or intended—perhaps even primarily so—
consequences of the [measure] in the areas of economic and fiscal policy, the 
possibility of which the ECB at the very least knowingly accepted; in doing so, the 
CJEU allows the ESCB to decide autonomously on the scope of the competences 
 
84 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (3rd ed., OUP 2018), 644-651; Herwig C. H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe 
and Alexander Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (OUP 2011), 129-134; Takis 
Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed., OUP 2006), 142-149, 177-183. 
85 Craig (n 84) 670-681; Tridimas (n 84) 138, 209-220. 
86 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13 YBEL 105, 111. 
87 ibid 111. Low intensity proportionality review is particularly prevalent in cases where EU institutions make 
discretionary policy choices, Craig (n 84) 644-651. 
88 For a similar view, see Dieter Grimm, ‘A Long Time Coming’ (2020) 21 German L.J. 944, 948; Simon and 
Rathke (n 83) 953. It should be emphasised that we only explore what motivated the FCC to challenge the 
proportionality test of the Court of Justice. We do not dispute that there are good reasons why national legislation 
that impinges, for example, on the free movement rights under the TFEU should be subject to stricter scrutiny 
than discretionary policy choices of EU institutions, see Craig (n 84) 652-653, 682-684. 
89 Engel, Nowag and Groussot (n 81) 136. 
90 The FCC takes issue with the fact that the Court of Justice often performs a relatively detailed assessment of 
the actual economic effects of a challenged measure when it carries out a proportionality review, whereas neither 
Gauweiler nor Weiss contain such an assessment, FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 143. The FCC then produces 
a long list of references to decisions of the Court of Justice that commingles review standards from different 
contexts in order to substantiate the claim that the Court’s review intensity with respect to actions of the ECB is 
unusually low, ibid paras 146-152. We are grateful to Damian Chalmers for pointing this out. For this reason, the 
direction of some of the initial, often strident criticism of the FCC’s judgment in Weiss, which focused on the 
court’s ‘German understanding of proportionality’, detracted from the true shortcomings of the decision, see 
Engel, Nowag and Groussot (n 81) 136 for examples and references. 
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conferred upon it by the Member States …  [and declares] asset purchases [as valid] 
even in cases where the purported monetary policy objective is possibly only 
invoked to disguise what essentially constitutes an economic and fiscal policy 
agenda.91 
 
This is a reading of the Court’s approach that ignores the ordinary meaning of the term ‘indirect 
effects’ as used in Gauweiler and Weiss.92 It is true that the Court of Justice did not balance the 
(direct or indirect) economic policy effects of the PSPP against the objectives of the programme 
at the third stage of the proportionality test, as demanded by the FCC. However, it is not true 
that the Court of Justice, by not doing so, failed to accord ‘foreseeable and/or intended … 
consequences of [a measure of the ECB] in the areas of economic and fiscal policy’ any 
relevance. As discussed in the previous section, a reading of Gauweiler and Weiss that gives 
due weight to the ordinary meaning of ‘indirect effects’ implies that direct effects (and certainly 
direct effects that are foreseeable and intended) change the character of a measure as monetary 
or economic policy. The difference to the FCC’s test is simply that the delimitation operates 
along a different dimension: direct versus indirect effects as opposed to a weighting of the 
different effects.93 
The FCC’s view seems to stem from its disagreement with the Court’s treatment of 
‘foreseeable consequences’. Criticising Gauweiler, the FCC had submitted in its reference in 
Weiss that the effects of a measure that purportedly pursued a monetary policy objective could 
not be regarded as indirect if they were ‘foreseeable with certainty’ and hence either ‘intended 
or knowingly accepted’ by the ECB.94 From the FCC’s perspective, this is convincing, since 
the FCC argues in favour of a comprehensive balancing of monetary and economic 
consequences, but does not automatically regard a measure as impermissible if (direct or 
indirect) consequences for economic policy exist.95 The Court of Justice rejected this wide 
interpretation, because for the Court, the existence of foreseeable economic policy effects 
(which, according to the FCC, had to be regarded as direct effects because they were 
foreseeable and knowingly accepted) would otherwise preclude the ESCB from implementing 
the measure.96 From the Court’s perspective, a broad interpretation of ‘direct effects’ would 
have thus made it impossible for the ESCB to pursue its monetary policy mandate, which 
required it to act on economic conditions to influence price levels.97 The FCC and the Court of 
Justice are, therefore, talking past each other. The passage of the FCC’s judgment rejecting the 
Court’s argument that certain effects (namely, indirect effects) may be disregarded even if they 
are foreseeable and knowingly accepted (which is the passage we reproduced in parts above98) 
 
91 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) paras 136-137. 
92 See the two paragraphs starting with the text to nn 62-63 in section III.A. 
93 This interpretation of Weiss is, thus, the answer to the question posed by some voices in the literature ‘why the 
CJEU did not seek to analyze whether the monetary policy measures were appropriate given the effects on 
economic policy’, Simon and Rathke (n 83) 954. 
94 PSPP referral (n 7) para 119; FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 135. 
95 See the description of the FCC’s proportionality test in the text to nn 76-80 above. 
96 Weiss (n 9) para 67. 
97 ibid. 
98 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 137. 
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quotes selectively one paragraph from the Court’s decision in Weiss, where the Court spoke of 
‘effects’, rather than distinguishing between direct and indirect effects.99 The FCC then 
concludes that the Court of Justice disregards the economic policy effects of the PSPP 
altogether.100 However, the quoted paragraph is a continuation of the Court’s discussion of 
indirect effects and applies only to them.101 The FCC’s central point of criticism is therefore a 
non sequitur. 
Second, neither the direct/indirect effects test nor the Court’s limited proportionality 
review of acts of the ECB are new features of the judgment in Weiss. In Gauweiler, the Court 
of Justice followed an identical methodology to distinguish between monetary and economic 
policy. It interpreted the term ‘monetary policy’ according to the two-pronged test set out in 
the previous section and, once it had established that OMT was to be qualified as a monetary 
policy measure, examined the proportionality of the measure.102 Furthermore, the Court’s 
lenient standard of review, under which the ECB is afforded broad discretion because of the 
‘technical nature’ of its assessment and the ‘forecasts and complex assessments’ that it 
involves,103 reflects the Court’s application of the proportionality principle in similar 
circumstances.104 In its judgment on OMT, the FCC regarded this methodological approach as 
‘tenable and correspond[ing] to the established case law of the Court of Justice’,105 even though 
the Court used proportionality ‘at the level of the exercise of competences’106 and ignored 
economic policy considerations in its analysis of the proportionality of OMT. It is difficult to 
understand why the same approach was qualified as not ‘tenable from a methodological 
perspective’ and ‘objectively arbitrary’ in the FCC’s PSPP judgment.107 The FCC’s judgment 
is thus methodologically problematic itself and can be challenged for reasons of both using an 
incorrect premise and being inconsistent with the FCC’s own precedent. 
 
IV. PROHIBITION OF MONETARY FINANCING 
Article 123(1) TFEU prohibits the ECB and the national central banks from granting credit 
facilities to Member States or purchasing debt instruments directly from them on the primary 
market. The prohibition of monetary financing seeks to ensure that financial markets price 
government debt accurately and penalise excessive deficits, thus giving Member States an 
incentive to follow a sound budgetary policy.108 The risk that the market price of government 
debt is distorted, of course, exists not only if the Eurosystem purchases government bonds on 
 
99 Weiss (n 9) para 67. 
100 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 138. 
101 The Court of Justice rejected the FCC’s submission that foreseeable effects could not be qualified as ‘indirect’ 
in para 62 of its decision in Weiss. It then gave two reasons why an effect was not ‘direct’ for the sole reason that 
it was foreseeable, the first discussed in para 63 and the second in paras 64-67. 
102 Gauweiler (n 8) paras 46-65 (delimitation of monetary policy) and 66-92 (proportionality). 
103 ibid para 68. 
104 See the references in n 87 above. 
105 FCC judgment on OMT (n 10) para 177. 
106 ibid para 179. 
107 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) paras 118, 119. 
108 Gauweiler (n 8) para 100; Weiss (n 9) para 107. 
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the primary market, but also if it does so on the secondary market. It is empirically well 
documented that the announcement of an asset purchase programme leads to a decline in the 
yields on government bonds. 109 Indeed, this is necessary for asset purchase programmes to 
have an effect on the ultimate target variable or variables, notably inflation.110 The literature 
has identified several transmission channels of secondary market asset purchases to interest 
rates.111 To give just one intuitive example, a government bond purchase programme decreases 
the supply of the purchased securities in the secondary market and replaces them with short-
term, risk-free bank reserves (i.e. cash). According to basic macroeconomic theory, an increase 
in the demand for cash must go hand in hand with a decrease in the interest rate on (or an 
increase in the price of) alternative essentially risk-free assets.112 The reason is that investors 
have different attitudes towards the interest rate risk associated with assets with longer 
maturities. As the amount of securities with a higher duration risk decreases, those who are 
comparatively more willing to bear the relevant risk will decide to invest or remain invested, 
thus exerting a downward pressure on the risk premium required by the market.113 Since an 
increase of bond prices in the secondary market gives an incentive to invest in the primary 
market, yields decrease, and governments have lower financing costs. 
Given that primary and secondary market purchases have similar effects, a literal 
interpretation of Article 123 TFEU that prohibited only primary market interventions would be 
unconvincing, and the Court of Justice has indeed not adopted such a narrow approach. 
According to the Court, any intervention in sovereign debt markets by the ECB must come 
with ‘sufficient safeguards’ that prevent moral hazard and ensure that Member States do not 
deviate from a sound budgetary policy.114 In its OMT decision, the ECB was well aware of the 
link between asset purchases that resulted in more favourable financing conditions for Member 
States and the existence (or the risk) of ‘policy mistakes’, as Mario Draghi put it in the press 
conference announcing the OMT decision, which imperilled the sustainability of public 
finances.115 The ECB therefore made outright monetary transactions conditional on the 
participation of the Member State(s) concerned in an EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment 
programme or precautionary programme and on full compliance with the conditionality 
attached to such a programme.116 We will first describe the link between conditionality and the 
prevention of moral hazard, before we analyse the Court’s approach to interpreting Article 
123(1) TFEU in greater detail in the following section. 
 
109 For a discussion of the literature and empirical evidence, see Jens H.E. Christensen and Signe Krogstrup, 
‘Transmission of Quantitative Easing: The Role of Central Bank Reserves’ (2019) 129 Economic Journal 249. 
110 Gauweiler (n 8) paras 108, 110; Weiss (n 9) para 130. 
111 Christensen and Krogstrup (n 109) 249-250; Arvind Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, ‘The 
Effects of Quantitative Easing on Long-term Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy’ (2011) 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 215, 218-225. 
112 See, for example, James Tobin, ‘Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk’ (1958) 25 Rev. Econ. Stud. 
65, 67-70. 
113 Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache and Brian Sack, ‘The Financial Market Effects of the Federal 
Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases’ (2011) 7 International Journal of Central Banking 3, 7. 
114 Gauweiler (n 8) paras 100-102; Weiss (n 9) para 107. 
115 Mario Draghi, press conference of 6 September 2012 (n 36). See also the arguments of the ECB in Gauweiler, 
Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 39) para 141. 
116 ECB Press Release (n 1). 
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A. The ECB’s approach: Conditionality 
All forms of financial assistance by the ESM (and previously the EFSF) must be subject to 
strict conditionality, which ranges from a macro-economic adjustment programme if stability 
support is provided by way of a loan to more specific eligibility criteria.117 The precise 
conditions are agreed between the Commission, ECB, IMF and the recipient Member State and 
laid down in a memorandum of understanding.118 They include fiscal conditions intended to 
ensure the sustainability of the beneficiary Member State’s debt, for example the requirement 
to achieve a specified primary surplus and adopt clearly defined structural policies to meet 
agreed fiscal targets.119 The fiscal policy choices of beneficiary Member States are, 
accordingly, constrained. In particular, if the memorandum of understanding imposes 
numerical limits on budgetary aggregates, such as the primary deficit, it is easy to monitor 
whether a Member State adheres to a sound budgetary policy. Thus, once conditionality is in 
place, moral hazard is all but eliminated. This explains why the ECB insisted on conditionality 
in its OMT decision and the Court of Justice held in Gauweiler that conditionality ‘preclude[d] 
the possibility of [OMT] … acting as an incentive … to dispense with fiscal consolidation’.120 
In a different context, the legality of the ESM, it has been pointed out that conditionality cannot 
guarantee that a Member State will not act irresponsibly in anticipation of receiving financial 
assistance.121 The availability of financial assistance, the argument goes, may prompt Member 
States to leave the path of fiscal prudence before a macro-economic adjustment programme 
commences and any constraints on fiscal policy apply. Whether this is a serious risk depends 
on the political cost that is involved in surrendering fiscal autonomy, which can be substantial, 
as the Greek example has shown, and the extent to which decision-makers factor the cost in 
when they make fiscal policy choices. More importantly, the moral hazard at issue here is 
different from that created by the ESM. Under the OMT programme, the ECB does not hold 
out the possibility of a bailout. Rather, the announcement of OMT removed the risk of a self-
fulfilling solvency crisis and thus allowed Member States122 to finance their expenditure at a 
lower cost than would otherwise have been possible. Increasing expenditure because of lower 
financing costs does not threaten a sound budgetary position, provided the increase in 
expenditure reflects the savings from lower interest payments, and may indeed be the welfare-
maximising course of action. Once OMT is implemented and the Eurosystem commences its 
bond-buying programme, a macro-economic adjustment programme must be in place, thus 
again containing moral hazard. 
Consequently, conditionality plays a key role in ensuring that secondary market 
purchases do not jeopardise the objective of Article 123(1) TFEU. However, the Court of 
 
117 ESM Treaty, Arts 12(1), 16(2) (ESM loans), 17(2) (primary market support facility), 18(3) (secondary market 
support facility). 
118 ibid Art 13(3). 
119 See, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and Greece, August 2015, pp 
6-17. 
120 Gauweiler (n 8) para 120. 
121 Paul Craig, ‘Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology’ (2013) 20 MJ 3, 8-9. 
122 Especially those who find themselves in a bad equilibrium, see the text to n 64 above. 
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Justice mentioned conditionality in Gauweiler only in passing towards the end of its judgment, 
after it discussed other safeguards that feature less prominently in the design of OMT at 
considerable length.123 We turn to these other safeguards and the test developed by the Court 
of Justice in Gauweiler and Weiss now. 
 
B. Incoherence, part 2: The Court’s equivalence/sufficient safeguards test 
According to the Court of Justice, secondary market asset purchases are incompatible with the 
prohibition of monetary financing if they are carried out ‘under conditions which would, in 
practice, mean that [they have] an effect equivalent to that of a direct purchase of government 
bonds from … the Member States, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the prohibition in 
Article 123(1) TFEU.’124 The latter point—not undermining the effectiveness of the prohibition 
of monetary financing—requires, in the view of the Court, that safeguards are built into ECB 
interventions in government debt markets that limit the impact of asset purchases on Member 
State incentives.125 This two-pronged test has become the general standard against which the 
compatibility of an asset purchase programme with Article 123(1) is assessed. We shall 
examine both prongs in turn. 
When the Court speaks of ‘equivalent effects’, it seems to have a test in mind that 
examines whether secondary market purchases have identical, rather than merely similar, 
effects to primary market purchases. The Court has held that secondary market transactions are 
equivalent to primary market transactions ‘if the potential purchasers of government bonds on 
the primary market knew for certain that the ESCB was going to purchase those bonds within 
a certain period and under conditions allowing those market operators to act, de facto, as 
intermediaries for the ESCB’.126 Requiring certainty establishes a threshold that will virtually 
never be met. Even in the unrealistic scenario that the Eurosystem committed to purchasing all 
bonds of a certain issue that were identifiable (thus, all bonds with the same ISIN), sales would 
presumably only be made under conditions resembling the transactions of an intermediary if 
the risk that the market price changed between the purchase and sale by the Eurosystem’s 
counterparty was minimal. For this to be the case, the Eurosystem would need to purchase the 
bonds immediately after they were issued. OMT passed the test easily, because the ECB and 
national central banks intended to observe a minimum period before purchasing bonds on the 
secondary market and refrain from making any prior announcement of either the decision to 
carry out purchases or their volume.127 In contrast, the main features of the PSPP, in particular 
the monthly volume of purchases, the duration of the programme, and the allocation of asset 
purchases among the national central banks, are announced in advance. However, the 
observance of a ‘blackout period’ before any intervention in the secondary market, the 
possibility to deviate, within certain parameters, from the monthly purchase guidance, and a 
 
123 The discussion of Art 123(1) TFEU begins in para 93 of Gauweiler, and conditionality is only mentioned in 
one paragraph (para 120). 
124 Gauweiler (n 8) para 97. Similar Weiss (n 9) para 106. 
125 Gauweiler (n 8) para 102; Weiss (n 9) para 107. 
126 Gauweiler (n 8) para 104; Weiss (n 9) para 110. 
127 Gauweiler (n 8) para 106. 
 20 
33% cap on purchases of both a particular bond issue and all of the outstanding securities of a 
government meant, in the opinion of the Court, that private market participants could not 
foresee with certainty whether the Eurosystem would purchase bonds acquired by them in the 
primary market.128 It is evident that certainty is lacking under these conditions. If we accept 
the narrow definition of ‘equivalent effects’ set out in Gauweiler and Weiss, purchasers of 
government bonds in the primary market cannot be regarded as de facto intermediaries for the 
Eurosystem in either case, since they bear the risk of price changes until they actually sell to 
the Eurosystem. 
Irrespective of its limited practical relevance, it is questionable whether this prong of 
the Court’s test performs a useful function. The position of private market participants as ‘de 
facto intermediaries for the ESCB’ has little bearing on the incentives of Member States to 
increase or reduce their borrowing, and hence on the goal of the prohibition of monetary 
financing. As explained, purchases on the secondary market lead to a general lowering of yields 
on government bonds. Whether the Eurosystem’s secondary market purchases have identical 
(or similar) effects to transactions on the primary market depends, from the perspective of the 
borrower, not on the certainty with which an individual purchaser can resell bonds to the 
Eurosystem, but on the volume of the intervention compared with a hypothetical direct 
intervention in the primary market.  
The second prong of the Court’s test concerns this last point. In Gauweiler and Weiss, 
the Court identified a number of safeguards that, in the Court’s opinion, ensured that the asset 
purchase programmes did not ‘lessen the impetus of the Member States concerned to follow a 
sound budgetary policy.’129 First, purchases were only conducted to the extent necessary for 
the maintenance of price stability (PSPP) or to unblock the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (OMT) and were then expected to cease.130 This meant, the Court argued, that 
Member States could not ‘rely on the certainty that the ESCB will at a future point purchase 
their government bonds on secondary markets’ and the purchase programmes could not be used 
to eliminate spreads in interest rates between Member States irrespective of any fiscal 
differences.131 Both points are, of course, correct, but they are, arguably, irrelevant to the 
objective of ensuring a sound budgetary policy. Even a temporary purchase of government 
bonds reduces yields and hence financing costs for Member States. This shifts a government’s 
budget constraint, and, assuming that the government seeks to maximise the provision of public 
goods subject to its budget constraint, it will spend more. Thus, monetary financing of public 
expenditure occurs. As the Court acknowledged in Gauweiler and Weiss, this effect is inherent 
in all public sector asset purchase programmes, which are explicitly permitted by the statute of 
the ESCB and the ECB.132 Whether government finances become less sustainable as a result is 
a different question that depends on the government’s fiscal policy after the end of the stimulus 
package and not on the ‘certainty’ that the purchase programme will continue indefinitely or 
the elimination of spreads between Member States. It is easy to see that this is the case by 
 
128 Weiss (n 9) paras 113-125. 
129 Gauweiler (n 8) para 109. 
130 Gauweiler (n 8) para 112; Weiss (n 9) paras 133-134. 
131 Gauweiler (n 8) para 113. Similar Weiss (n 9) para 132. 
132 See nn 49-50, 110 above and accompanying text. 
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considering a government’s intertemporal budget constraint, which models the government’s 
debt dynamics (change in debt) as a function of expenditure, tax revenue and interest payments. 
Over the duration of an asset purchase programme, the budget deficit remains constant (change 
in debt is zero) if an increase in expenditure can be financed out of cheaper debt (lower interest 
payments).133 After a central bank’s intervention has ended, the budget deficit, of course, only 
remains constant if expenditure is again reduced. Without any safeguards, it is perhaps 
unrealistic to expect that this will happen, given the particularities of the political economy of 
debt.134 However, the structure of an asset purchase programme has nothing to do with this 
problem. Rather, the necessary safeguards must be in the form of fiscal rules or other controls 
over fiscal policy.135 
Second, the ECB’s asset purchase programmes were limited in size.136 Central banks 
typically announce the amount of sovereign debt they intend to purchase in a quantitative 
easing programme each month in advance in order to condition the market. The ECB’s PSPP 
decision is no exception.137 Furthermore, asset purchases under the PSPP are allocated among 
the euro area national central banks according to a pre-determined ratio, based on the key for 
subscriptions to the ECB’s capital (rather than the level of debt of a Member State).138 The 
Court of Justice argued that Member States, consequently, had no incentive to increase 
government debt in response to the implementation of the PSPP, which would only result in a 
comparatively smaller proportion of a state’s bonds being purchased by the Eurosystem.139 The 
OMT programme, in contrast, operates with no ex ante quantitative limits. However, the Court 
held that OMT was de facto limited in size, since bonds were only eligible for purchase if the 
issuing Member State underwent a structural adjustment programme and the Eurosystem was 
able to sell the purchased bonds at any time.140 
Again, it is not clear why these aspects of the bank’s asset purchase programmes should 
be relevant to the question of how moral hazard can be contained. The size of OMT is only 
limited at the level of the Eurozone as a whole, but not at the level of an individual state.141 
Limitations that exist at the level of an individual state, as under the PSPP, limit asset price 
distortions, but do not ensure that the Member State concerned will follow a sound budgetary 
policy. As explained, any meaningful secondary market intervention will, by definition, have 
an impact on government bond yields and hence provide an incentive to increase government 
expenditure. Moral hazard that arises as a consequence of an asset purchase programme can be 
controlled through appropriate fiscal rules, but not through volume limits on asset purchases 
or by allocating purchases within the Eurosystem according to a key that is independent of debt 
 
133 For a more formal model, see Wendy Carlin and David Soskice, Macroeconomics: Institutions, Instability and 
the Financial System (OUP 2015), 518-519. 
134 On this point, see ibid 535-537. 
135 ibid 537-541. 
136 Gauweiler (n 8) para 116; Weiss (n 9) paras 139-141. 
137 See, initially, Decision (EU) 2015/774 (n 2) recital 7. 
138 ibid Art 6(2). 
139 Weiss (n 9) para 140. 
140 Gauweiler (n 8) paras 116-117. 
141 Apart from the fact that the ECB declared that it would focus on bonds with shorter maturities, ECB Press 
Release (n 1). 
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levels. Likewise, the resale of bonds by the Eurosystem in the secondary market does not 
change the fact that the initial purchase may contribute to the financing of government 
expenditure. This may create commitments on the part of the Member State that cannot be 
reversed easily when the Eurosystem’s intervention ends and hence may initiate an upward 
trend in the government’s debt ratio. Whether the knowledge that the Eurosystem is able to sell 
purchased bonds constitutes an effective deterrent that prevents the beneficiary Member State 
from undertaking such commitments in the first place may be doubted. 
Third, asset purchases were restricted to bonds that were either of investment grade142 
or issued by a country subject to a financial assistance programme, notably an EFSF/ESM 
adjustment programme.143 We have argued above that a structural adjustment programme is an 
appropriate measure to safeguard against a circumvention of Article 123(1) TFEU, since it 
establishes fiscal rules and imposes other fiscal constraints on a Member State with the goal of 
safeguarding or restoring the sustainability of the Member State’s public debt.144 Whether the 
risk that a credit rating agency downgrades government debt to below investment grade is 
sufficient to incentivise a Member State to follow a sound budgetary policy is more difficult to 
assess. Credit rating agencies will rate an issuer as investment grade only if the issuer has the 
capacity to meet its financial commitments and respond adequately to adverse economic 
shocks.145 A fiscal policy that seeks to deliver sustainable public finances and allows the 
government to respond effectively to economic shocks may be called ‘sound’ within the 
meaning of Gauweiler and Weiss. In principle, distinguishing between investment grade and 
non-investment grade securities is, therefore, an appropriate criterion that promotes the 
objective of Article 123(1) TFEU. 
However, two objections may be made to this preliminary conclusion. First, credit 
ratings are a function of the combined consideration of a variety of institutional, economic, 
fiscal and monetary variables.146 The effect of changes along one dimension— in the present 
context fiscal conditions—on the rating outcome is, therefore, attenuated and possibly offset 
by changes along other dimensions. In theory, this does not call into question the suitability of 
credit ratings to assess the effect that fiscal policy adjustments have on a country’s public debt 
sustainability and resilience to economic shocks. This is evident for variables that have a direct 
impact on debt levels and debt sustainability, for example the ratio of government debt to GDP 
or economic growth.147 It is reasonable to assume that an asset purchase programme does not 
change a government’s incentives with regard to fiscal policy if an increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is offset by a more positive assessment of an issuer’s economy and growth prospects. The 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio might have been triggered by the asset purchase programme 
or the improved growth forecast (or both), but the situation of the country has not changed in 
 
142 Decision (EU) 2020/188 (n 2), Art 3(2). The Decision requires Credit Quality Step 3 in the Eurosystem’s 
harmonised rating scale, which is equivalent to investment grade, see ECB Monthly Bulletin April 2014, p 30. 
143 Gauweiler (n 8) para 120; Weiss (n 9) para 142. 
144 Text to nn 117-122. 
145 See, for example, S&P Global Ratings Definitions (2017), p 5; S&P Sovereign Rating Methodology (2017), p 
3. 
146 S&P Sovereign Rating Methodology (2017), pp 2-5. 
147 For an example of the methodology that credit rating agencies typically use to assess a sovereign borrower’s 
economic situation, see ibid pp 9-12. 
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comparison with a scenario where the government had not borrowed more, but the economy 
had also not improved. The same line of reasoning holds for ‘softer’ variables, for example the 
accountability of government institutions and the absence of corruption.148 Again, if an increase 
in borrowing is offset by an improvement in the institutional environment, it is justified to 
regard an asset purchase programme as not jeopardising the aim of Article 123(1) TFEU, since 
better institutions make it more likely that the government will manage its debt more 
competently and prudently. However, the problem with such ‘softer’ measures, and more 
generally with the drawing up of a matrix of variables and their interactions to determine a 
country’s credit rating,149 is that they introduce a considerable amount of noise. Inevitably, a 
certain degree of subjectivity is involved in defining and weighting the relevant variables and 
assessing a country’s situation. Thus, it is possible that a country’s creditworthiness 
deteriorates as a consequence of a monetary policy measure, without this being reflected in a 
corresponding decrease in the country’s credit rating. 
The second objection is that credit ratings operate retroactively. It is therefore 
questionable whether the threat of a potential downgrade is enough to incentivise a Member 
State not to deviate from a sound budgetary policy when presented with a monetary policy 
intervention that creates favourable financing conditions. As discussed, credit ratings are 
partially subjective. Therefore, a downgrade cannot be predicted with certainty and its deterrent 
effects must be discounted accordingly. Furthermore, those who make fiscal policy decision 
may rationally decide to accept the risk that the government’s credit rating could be 
downgraded in order to be able to pursue economic policy goals that are regarded as taking 
priority over fiscal reticence. 
While the risk of a credit rating downgrade will, therefore, not always be effective, it is 
important to note that the investment-grade requirement does not operate in a legal vacuum. 
We have argued above that some control over a Member State’s fiscal policy decisions after 
the termination of an asset purchase programme is essential to prevent the goal of Article 
123(1) TFEU from being compromised. Such a control mechanism exists in the EU in the form 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Fiscal Compact.150 The SGP has introduced a 
process of budgetary surveillance and coordinated formulation of the Member States’ annual 
budgets and economic policies.151 As part of this process, Member States are required to set a 
medium-term objective for their budgetary position that should be close to balance.152 For 
signatories of the Fiscal Compact, the structural deficit is limited to 0.5% of GDP, unless debt 
 
148 Such institutional variables are discussed and defined ibid on pp 5-9. 
149 See ibid p 4. 
150 The SGP is composed of several measures of primary and secondary EU law: Arts 121, 126, 136 TFEU, 
Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure annexed to the TFEU, [2008] OJ C 115/279, and the ‘Six-
pack’ and ‘Two-pack’ packages of regulations and directives. For a full list, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro_en (follow hyperlinks ‘EU Economic governance: monitoring, prevention, correction’ and ‘Legal 
basis of the Stability and Growth Pact’). The European Fiscal Compact refers to Art 3 Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (TSCG), which requires the signatory states to maintain a balanced budget. 
151 For a description of the process, see European Commission, Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact, 
European Economy Institutional Paper 101, April 2019, 74-86. 
152 Art 2a Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, [1997] OJ L 209/1, as amended by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1055/2005, [2005] OJ L 174/1, and Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011, [2011] OJ L 306/12, requires 
Member States to specify a medium-term budgetary objective within a range of -1% of GDP and surplus. 
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is significantly below 60% of GDP.153 Member States that are at their medium-term objective 
must ensure that government expenditure does not grow more than predicted GDP growth, and 
Member States that are below their medium-term objective must formulate an adjustment path 
that includes a rate of expenditure growth below predicted GDP growth.154 The Council and 
Commission monitor compliance with the SGP and can issue warnings, recommend policy 
changes, and, as a last resort, impose sanctions on Member States.155 In addition, the SGP 
contains a corrective arm, also known as the excessive deficit procedure, which is triggered if 
a Member State exceeds a structural deficit of 3% of GDP or a government-debt-to-GDP ratio 
of 60%.156 The Commission and Council will then recommend adjustments to correct the fiscal 
imbalances and, if the Member State concerned does not take effective action, step up the 
excessive deficit procedure, potentially leading to the imposition of fines.157 After the SGP was 
initially criticised for a lack of enforcement, the excessive deficit procedure was made more 
automatic and surveillance and coordination were strengthened with the adoption of the so-
called ‘Six-pack’ in 2011.158 Recent empirical findings indicate that the SGP significantly 
shapes fiscal policy in the Eurozone and gives an impetus for fiscal consolidation.159 It does 
not seem incoherent to argue, as did the Court of Justice in Weiss, that the threat posed by a 
potential credit rating downgrade, in an environment where fiscal policy choices of Member 
States are already constrained, provides a sufficient safeguard against the moral hazard 
otherwise caused by an asset purchase programme. 
 
V. THE PANDEMIC EMERGENCY PURCHASE PROGRAMME AND OTHER 
GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET INTERVENTIONS 
A. Monetary policy mandate 
The PEPP aims to counteract ‘the serious risks to price stability, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and the economic outlook in the euro area’ caused by the COVID-19 
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crisis.160 Under the PEPP, the Eurosystem purchases eligible securities, including bonds issued 
by Member State governments, on secondary markets. The allocation of purchases is, in 
principle, based on the key for subscriptions to the ECB’s capital, but the Executive Board may 
decide to deviate from the capital key.161 Unlike the PSPP, the PEPP does not impose 
quantitative limits on purchases on an issuer basis.162 It also does not impose any conditionality 
on asset purchases, other than that government bonds must be of investment grade,163 and 
furthermore waives this latter requirement for debt securities issued by Greece.164 
 The PEPP falls within the mandate of the ECB if it pursues a monetary policy goal, 
makes use of a monetary policy instrument, has only indirect effects on policy goals not related 
to monetary policy, in particular on economic policy goals (we have called this condition the 
Court’s direct/indirect effects test), and is proportionate to the goal pursued. It is clear that the 
first two conditions are satisfied. Asset purchases in secondary markets constitute a monetary 
policy instrument, and the goals pursued by the PEPP according to the ECB decision 
establishing the purchase programme fall within monetary policy.  
The application of the direct/indirect effects test is more difficult. As currently 
implemented, purchases under the PEPP are largely in line with the ECB capital key and mirror 
transactions under the PSPP. Like the PSPP, the PEPP thus has an impact at the second stage 
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and any effects that fall within economic 
policy, for example on refinancing costs of Member States and general economic conditions, 
are indirect.165 However, the financial firepower of the PEPP could also be concentrated on 
individual Member States. This would directly affect financial stability if the purchases (or 
their announcement) removed the threat of a self-fulfilling solvency crisis by guaranteeing the 
liquidity of a Member State (that is, the ECB operated through the PEPP as a lender of last 
resort). Thus, where a Member State experiences a liquidity crisis, the PEPP could be used to 
the same effect as OMT. It is unlikely that asset purchases under the PEPP will indeed be 
deployed in this way, since the credit rating of a Member State that experiences difficulties in 
refinancing its debt is likely to be downgraded to below investment grade. This would render 
government bonds—with the exception of Greek bonds—ineligible, unless the PEPP decision 
was amended to include another waiver. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a consistent 
application of the direct/indirect effects test imposes limitations on how the PEPP, and more 
generally a programme that allows for selective asset purchases, can be used.166 A bond buying 
 
160 Decision (EU) 2020/440 (n 3) recital 4. 
161 ibid recital 5, Art 5. 
162 Art 4 of Decision (EU) 2020/440 provides that ‘[p]urchases shall be carried out under the PEPP to the extent 
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An asset purchase programme has effects on financial stability, and thus on an economic policy goal, if selectivity 
is used to signal the availability of sufficient liquidity to prevent a liquidity crisis from developing into a solvency 
crisis. 
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programme that has a direct effect on financial stability or other economic policy goals is 
illegal, and there is no need to take recourse to the proportionality test of the Court of Justice, 
or the FCC’s more comprehensive proportionality review, to achieve this result. 
The Court’s proportionality test constitutes an additional constraint on the discretion of 
the ECB that is relevant to the question whether the programme’s monetary policy goal could 
have been achieved through other means, for example the use of standard monetary policy 
tools, a purchase programme with a smaller envelope, or a programme that targeted a narrower 
range of eligible assets.167 In addition, the risks associated with asset purchases, notably the 
exposure of national central banks and the ECB to the risk of losses, must not be manifestly 
disproportionate to the PEPP’s objectives.168 As mentioned, the PEPP allows for greater 
flexibility than the PSPP and entails, arguably, a greater risk of losses, since not all purchased 
bonds are of investment grade. However, the PSPP currently operates on the basis of the same 
key for the allocation of asset purchases and the same loss sharing principles as the PSPP. 
National central banks purchase securities of issuers based in their jurisdiction, and the 
potential mutualisation of losses is limited to the securities purchased by the ECB.169 Given 
these features of the PEPP and the wide margin of discretion that the ECB enjoys in deciding 
how to implement monetary policy, which is reflected in the ‘manifest error of assessment’ 
standard that the Court of Justice employs in its proportionality review,170 it is therefore likely 
that the Court will hold that the PEPP is proportionate.  
The FCC’s criticism of the standard of review of the Court of Justice concerned the fact 
that the Court only balanced the monetary policy objectives of asset purchases against the risk 
of losses and not more generally against the ‘adverse effects’ of asset purchases, for example 
the effect that low interest rates have on household savings.171 In the view of the FCC, this 
rendered the Court’s proportionality review ‘meaningless’.172 The discussion in the preceding 
paragraphs and in section III.B demonstrates that this criticism is misplaced. The function of 
distinguishing between monetary and economic policy measures, and thus protecting the 
Member States against encroachment on their competences, is performed by the direct/indirect 
effects test, not the proportionality test.173 The Court’s proportionality test, on the other hand, 
has the function of assessing whether the actual monetary policy effects of a measure map on 
to the purported monetary policy goals of that measure. For example, if the selective purchase 
of government bonds was justified with the disruption of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in some parts of the Eurozone but not in others, but there was insufficient evidence 
that that was actually the case, a purchase programme that targeted individual Member States 
 
167 Necessity stage of the proportionality review, see, e.g., Weiss (n 9) paras 79-92. 
168 Balancing stage of the proportionality review, see, e.g., Weiss (n 9) paras 93-99. 
169 The ECB’s share of purchases amounts to 20% of total public sector asset purchases, see Pandemic emergency 
purchase programme (PEPP) Questions & Answers, Q7, www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/pepp-
qa.en.html. 
170 Weiss (n 9) paras 78, 91. 
171 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 133. 
172 ibid. 
173 According to the FCC, its more comprehensive proportionality review has the purpose of safeguarding the 
competences of the Member States and reinforcing the principle of conferral, see ibid paras 133-134 and the text 
to n 82.  
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would be disproportionate. In contrast to the FCC’s approach, the legal tests developed by the 
Court of Justice lead to a conceptually clear distinction between the principles laid down in 
Article 5 TEU.174 The direct/indirect effects test polices the principle of conferral and the 
proportionality test the exercise of a conferred power. 
 
B. Prohibition of monetary financing 
The PEPP complies with the prohibition of monetary financing if it does not have effects 
equivalent to the direct purchase of government bonds on the primary market and provides for 
safeguards to ensure that Member States have sufficient incentives to follow a sound budgetary 
policy (equivalence/sufficient safeguards test). The first part of this test requires that secondary 
market purchasers do not act as de facto intermediaries for the Eurosystem. This is the case if 
they cannot foresee with certainty that the Eurosystem will purchase bonds acquired by them 
in the primary market.175 As mentioned, the Court of Justice relies on a multiplicity of criteria 
to assess foreseeability, including discretion in the timing of purchases and their allocation 
among national central banks, the duration of the programme, and the existence of a percentage 
cap on purchases of a particular issuer and bond issue.176 Under the PEPP, the Eurosystem 
follows a ‘flexible approach to the composition of purchases’,177 and, similar to the PSPP, it 
can be assumed that the Eurosystem will not intervene immediately after a bond issue.178 Under 
these conditions, it is clear that the high threshold of certainty is not met.  
Likewise, whether sufficient safeguards exist depends on a consideration of a totality 
of the circumstances. In Gauweiler and Weiss, the Court highlighted several factors that were 
important. Purchases were only carried out to the extent necessary to achieve the goals of the 
programmes, the overall size of the programmes was (de facto) limited, the Eurosystem had 
the option to sell the purchased bonds at any time, and purchased bonds had to be of investment 
grade (or, in Gauweiler, purchases were conditional on full compliance with a structural 
adjustment programme). The decision establishing the PEPP replicates the first three criteria,179 
but allows the purchase of government bonds of one Member State, Greece, even if the bonds 
are below investment grade.180 However, safeguards exist that allow the continued monitoring 
of the fiscal policy of the Greek government and the implementation of prior commitments to 
structural reform.181 While this so-called enhanced surveillance framework182 imposes less 
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Commission, Enhanced Surveillance Report – Greece, European Economy Institutional Paper 127, May 2020. 
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rigid constraints on a Member State’s fiscal autonomy than a macro-economic adjustment 
programme,183 it grants the ECB, Commission and Council enhanced powers in comparison 
with those under the SGP to review developments in the Member State concerned and 
recommend precautionary corrective measures or require the preparation of a draft macro-
economic adjustment programme.184 Considering that the ECB can, therefore, monitor in a 
targeted manner how government bond market interventions affect fiscal policy choices and 
that this is just one of several safeguards built into the PEPP, there are good reasons to conclude 
that the PEPP will pass the Court’s equivalence/sufficient safeguards test.185 
 The FCC was highly critical of the flexible multi-factor test of the Court of Justice, 
although it ultimately held that a ‘manifest violation’ of Article 123(1) TFEU had not been 
shown.186 Importantly, it emphasised in its judgment in Weiss that two conditions were 
indispensable for a public sector asset purchase programme to be legal: a purchase limit of 33% 
per ISIN and issuer and the requirement that purchased securities are of investment grade.187 
The PEPP does not fulfil either of these conditions. Thus, if the FCC applies its own criteria 
consistently, it will conclude that the PEPP constitutes prohibited monetary financing.188 
However, as discussed in section IV.B, purchase limits and other criteria that determine 
whether primary market purchasers act as de facto intermediaries for the Eurosystem do not 
have a bearing on the question whether Member States have sufficient incentives to follow a 
sound budgetary policy. Both the FCC and the Court of Justice agree that safeguarding sound 
public finances is the objective of Article 123(1) TFEU. Under a coherent interpretation of the 
provision, both courts should, accordingly, come to the conclusion that a purchase limit of 33% 
is not a necessary condition for compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing. 
 More generally, a coherent interpretation of Article 123(1) TFEU implies that public 
sector asset purchase programmes do not constitute prohibited monetary financing if controls 
over fiscal policy are in place that ensure that a Member State maintains sound public finances 
while the monetary policy intervention continues and, importantly, also when it ends.189 Such 
controls can be in the form of, for example, ESM conditionality, the requirement that purchased 
bonds are of investment grade, or enhanced surveillance of issuers if bonds are below 
 
183 See the text to nn 117-119 above. 
184 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, Arts 3, 14. 
185 Most commentators come to similar conclusions, see Matthias Goldmann, ‘Borrowing Time. The ECB’s 
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme’, VerfBlog, 27 March 2020, https://doi.org/10.17176/20200328-
002904-0; Mooij (n 178); Viterbo (n 188) 675-678, 680-681. Mark Dawson and Ana Bobić, ‘COVID-19 and the 
European Central Bank: The Legal Foundations of EMU as the Next Victim?’, Verfblog, 27 March 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.17176/20200327-122939-0, on the other hand, express doubts about the legality of the PEPP. 
They argue that, because of the PEPP’s volume, there was a high probability that bonds would be purchased by 
the Eurosystem, and the PEPP did not contain any reference to conditionality. However, the equivalence/sufficient 
safeguards test of the Court of Justice requires certainty, not a high probability. In addition, the necessary 
safeguards may, but do not have to, stem from conditionality under an assistance programme.  
186 FCC judgment on PSPP (n 11) para 180. The FCC argued that ‘[t]he CJEU’s conclusion … that the PSPP does 
not violate Art. 123(1) TFEU [met] with considerable concerns’. 
187 ibid paras 202, 208. 
188 This is also the view of Bobić and Dawson (n 81) 1991-1992; Annamaria Viterbo, ‘The PSPP Judgment of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court: Throwing Sand in the Wheels of the European Central Bank’ (2020) 5 
European Papers 671, 681-683. 
189 See the text to nn 133-135. 
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investment grade. On the other hand, it is irrelevant for the prohibition of monetary financing 
whether percentage limits per issuer and ISIN exist, or whether it can be foreseen when the 
Eurosystem will purchase bonds, what the monthly purchase volume is, how asset purchases 
are allocated, and for how long the programme will continue. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE IN 
ADJUDICATING EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
A perception that the legal framework governing European monetary union is applied 
inconsistently and incoherently threatens the long-term legitimacy of both the Court of Justice 
and the monetary policy of the ECB. In the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, inconsistency 
is a function of the different treatment of measures that had the same direct effect in Pringle 
and Gauweiler, namely, to safeguard financial stability, and analogously the identical treatment 
of measures that had different direct effects in Gauweiler and Weiss. This result follows from 
an application of the Court’s own legal test to distinguish between economic and monetary 
policy. An interpretation of the test based on an ordinary meaning of the criteria developed by 
the Court, the direct and indirect effects of a measure, implies that Gauweiler was decided 
incorrectly. It is thus ironic that Gauweiler was ultimately accepted by the FCC, albeit with 
reservations,190 whereas the FCC decided to challenge the supremacy of EU Law in Weiss, a 
decision that is entirely defensible from the standpoint of consistency and coherence and that 
is hardly methodologically untenable, as the FCC alleged. It can be assumed that the FCC’s 
uncompromising position in Weiss was influenced at least in part by the ambivalence that the 
Court of Justice itself injected into its legal analysis by applying its direct/indirect effects test 
inconsistently.191 
From an economic point of view, the Court of Justice, of course, had good reasons to 
decide Gauweiler as it did, given the exceptional circumstances that existed when the ECB 
issued its OMT decision.192 However, prioritising economic considerations comes at the cost 
of imperilling the legitimacy of the Court, particularly if it leads to inconsistency in the Court’s 
case law. It is, therefore, perhaps time for the Court to recalibrate its approach and ensure that 
a consistent and coherent application of the legal tests developed in Pringle, Gauweiler and 
Weiss is beyond doubt. The Court will have an opportunity to do so in the PEPP litigation. It 
should underline that the direct/indirect effects test sets objective limits on how the PEPP, and 
generally public sector asset purchase programmes, can be used and identify these limits more 
clearly than in Weiss. It should also stress that a coherent interpretation of the prohibition of 
monetary financing requires the existence of effective controls over the Member States’ fiscal 
 
190 FCC judgment on OMT (n 10) paras 181-189. 
191 Similarly, in the literature, it has been argued that the FCC’s decision to declare Weiss ultra vires was as much 
a reaction to the refusal of the Court of Justice to accept the FCC’s arguments in Gauweiler, as it was to the 
perceived failure to conduct a thorough proportionality review in Weiss, see Franz C. Mayer, ‘To Boldly Go 
Where No Court Has Gone Before: The German Federal Constitutional Court’s ultra vires Decision of May 5, 
2020’ (2020) 21 German L.J. 1116, 1125. 
192 See n 73 and accompanying text. 
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policies but does not require asset purchases to be structured so that primary market purchasers 
cannot expect the bonds they hold to be bought by the Eurosystem. 
Such a step would, arguably, alleviate the risk of further conflicts with the FCC. The 
Court’s direct/indirect effects test imposes an effective constraint on the ability of the ECB to 
determine the scope of its mandate autonomously.193 It thus introduces an important element 
of democratic accountability into the legal framework governing monetary policy measures194 
and addresses the main point of criticism of the FCC. It is also superior to the alternative test 
proposed by the FCC, which consists in a proportionality review that requires a balancing of 
the economic and monetary policy effects of monetary policy decisions.195 Reinforcing the role 
that the direct/indirect effects test plays in monitoring the principle of conferral might make it 
easier for the FCC to accept that the structural features of public sector asset purchase 
programmes that it held out as necessary conditions for compliance with the prohibition of 
monetary financing (some of which are absent in the case of the PEPP) should not, in fact, be 
seen as preconditions. For the long-term success of a rules-based monetary union, it is to be 
hoped that both the Court of Justice and the FCC will take steps in the indicated directions. 
 
193 See section III. 
194 de Haan and Eijffinger (n 18) 397-398. 
195 See the text to nn 76-82. 
